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Wronged political wives

February 5, 2010

Yep, I’ll go there.

There’s something great about these things. Political wives are pretty much the only group in our society that is forced to be in the public eye. (Child stars also come to mind.) Hollywood types tend to marry their own and no one really cares about the wives of athletes, CEOs, and writers. They at least have the option of remaining private citizens, but political wives don’t. What’s worse is that they have to take a passive role. Even when they’re active behind the scenes, as Jenny Sanford and Elizabeth Edwards apparently were, they’re required to give the appearance of passivity. Wives who come off as anything more than tea-hosting, controversy-avoiding props suffer for it: see Hillary Clinton circa 1993. Even if these post-scandal exposes are sensational and self-serving, it’s a little gratifying to see people finally using the system to which they were forcibly prostrated.

Decency and social psychology

February 4, 2010

1.

We’re no saints. All the same, most of us are good people…good enough anyway. We’re decent. We’re slobs but we’re muddling through. To be sure, there are felons among us, but if we didn’t on some level believe in a community of decency, what would we do? We’d have to cast ourselves out of society or else start burning it down.

This sounds self-congratulatory, and it’s true: never trust a self-proclaimed ‘decent person.’ It’s the worst kind of false modesty: smug and self-defeating. For humility is the core of decency: announcing it only tarnishes it, makes it indecent.

But it’s not just that some things should be kept private. It’s also that certain things should not be said at all, even in private. Decency is partly a matter of aspiration, and the decent person is always looking up, keeping eyes on the prize. The decent person never really settles for being what she is, even if it’s good enough.

This sounds puritanical in the colloquial sense, and it is in a way, insofar as it contains a truth that puritanical moralities distort to hideous effect. Being a good person means having certain ideals you can never achieve—that’s just, I think, a basic, inescapable feature of moral life. The error of puritanism is insisting that this gap is evidence of some basic, inescapable crime for which we must be punished, but for which we can never do penance, at least not in this life.

But it’s no more a crime than it’s a crime for a table to fall short of the ideal table in whose perfect image it was made. It’s no more a crime than having a human body—blemished, fragile, occasionally embarrassing, always decaying—is a crime. We are real, what we aim for is ideal; the two are simply separate. They are as different as the mold and what is cast in it.

Our virtues are, like our bodies, always imperfect. What perfection they have is the sort of perfection a lover’s body has, perfection in imperfection. If there is any truth in the myth of the Fall, it’s this.

Because there are real crimes out there, it’s a grave mistake to criminalize the merely non-ideal. The real crimes come from having the wrong ideals or from having the right ideals but betraying them. If everyone is necessarily a criminal then either no one is a criminal or the real criminals are incarnated evil.

Puritanism isn’t the only danger. You can go to the opposite, but no less hysterical extreme. You can see the gap between real and ideal as the opposite of a crime, as evidence of some basic, inescapable good deed, as a cause for celebration. This is more harmless than its opposite, but it’s no less deluded. It treats as a human action what is really just a part of the landscape in which we act.

Between the extremes, there is a kind of flabby middle ground. That is, you might simply temper your ideals, put more slack in the line, lower your sights a bit to something you might actually achieve. This is no doubt part of the answer. When we set ourselves to thinking about ideals, mission statements as it were, we have a tendency to aim too high in every direction. So we probably do need to lower our sights, but how far? To the point where ideals are achieved or approximated with some regularity? I cannot accept that our ideals must be humanly achievable. Morality is a bridle: it confers freedom only by tethering us, and there needs to be some tension in the reins.

People do often take the real, imperfect people around them as role models. But when they’re sincere, they always idealize them. They say: “If I could just be half the man my father was…” or “If I could just have half my mother’s courage…” They bristle at the thought that these virtues are really quite common and easily within their grasp.

So far the life of a decent person looks rather uncomfortable, both for her and for the people around her. But we do not live by ideals alone, even humble ones. Ideals should not be too high or too low, but they also need to be counterweighted. The flipside of having unachievable ideals is that they come with the realization that we are all equally fallen. We are all equally deserving of the kind of charity that can only exist between imperfect beings.

Moral life is complicated and I have only tried to describe a few of its broadest structural features. It has at least three distinguishable components: the ideals that we aim at, the charitable exemptions from these ideals that we grant to other imperfect beings, and the state of decency that comes only from honoring ideals and imperfection in the right proportion.

2.

All this is relevant in part because social psychologists have empirically shown that our virtues are even more fragile than we might have suspected. It’s no surprise that we act better when we are in a good mood, when we are relaxed, comfortable, well fed, undistracted. We are better when it’s easy to be good. The good are almost always lucky, for if they were unluckier they wouldn’t be good. But the extent of this fragility can be unsettling.

Studies have shown…. People are more significantly likely to help a passerby with a stack of spilled papers if they have just found a dime. They are significantly less likely to help someone slumped in a doorway when they believe they are late for a mundane appointment. But they are more likely to give change for dollar when enjoying the enticing smells outside a bakery. (These examples are drawn from chapter 2 of Kwame Anthony Appiah’s terrific book Experiments in Ethics, which stimulated much of this little reflection of mine.)

This is fodder for the puzzles and paranoia of philosophers. We think we have good grip on morality, but yet we misgauge how apparently decent people will act. Are we just completely in the dark about morality…if there really is any such thing at all?! How can there be such widespread deviations from morality among apparently decent people? How can the virtues of apparently decent people be impaired by something as trivial as mood? What, then, should we think of our moral role models? Is there a single honest man left?

Once you appreciate the complexities of moral life, the urgency subsides. Our virtues are, like our bodies, fragile. They fall short of the ideal even as they are bound to it. If we had different, lower, more manageable ideals, if we took the virtues we already have as our ideals, they would collapse completely.

So there are two distinct questions. What are the virtues of decent people and what are the ideals at which the virtues aim? These questions are often conflated because usually when we speak about virtue we simply mean the ideal, not the state achievable by aiming at the ideal. For example, when we ask what honesty requires, we are typically asking which ideal of honesty we should aim at. And this makes sense, since aiming always precedes acting and what we aim at determines how we act.

Most of us come from good homes, so most of us have a good grip on the ideals we should be aiming at. We can imagine, on a case-by-case basis, what a perfectly honest person would do, even if we can’t imagine what the life of such a person would be like. Moral ideals sometimes conflict, and then we are at a loss, but this is because we feel so acutely the pull of the conflicting ideals.

Having a grip on decency is something else altogether. Being mistaken in a wide range of cases about how a decent person will act is no impediment to being decent. As decent people, we are bound to aim higher than that!

The aspect of moral life that the research bears on most directly is charity, those exemptions from the ideal that are owed to fallen, fragile beings. Obviously, if decent people are more fragile than we expected, then they are owed a fuller measure of charity. But neither this nor the fact that decent people fall short of the ideal shows that our ideals are seriously in need of reform.

As I said, we have a tendency to gloss over the complexities of moral life by conflating the virtues of decent people with the ideals those virtues aim at. This is no less true when we try to attribute virtues to people, when we label people as honest or courageous, and particularly when we do so as a way of setting them up as role models or allies. For what we then hunger for is the impossible, an ideal made flesh.

But this doesn’t mean we need to cast off our role models and admired friends in a fit disillusionment. It just means that we should appreciate this practice for what it is. Is it really a surprise that there never has been and never will be a truly honest man? Does it really matter? Those we admire are not infallible guides to moral life, and that’s not ultimately what we use them for anyway. Their examples are far closer to talismans that we press blindly to our flesh in order to steel ourselves.

Pacifism, purity, and affirmative action

February 3, 2010

Over time, arguments take on surprising historical resonances. For example, people often question the moral logic of affirmative action on the grounds that it’s absurd to fight racism with racism. Whatever you think of the argument, it taps into and appropriates a certain high-minded style of thought traditionally associated with extreme pacifism, the conviction that it’s absurd to fight violence with violence, that violence is an evil that irredeemably taints all who touch it. In the 19th century, we find this in the Non-Resistance movement of William Lloyd Garrison and Adin Ballou. They, in turn, found it in Jesus’s injunction to turn the other cheek (Matthew 5:39). Here is an excerpt from Adin Ballou’s ‘Catechism of Non-Resistance’:

Q. Wherein lies the chief significance of the doctrine of non-resistance?

A. In the fact that it alone allows of the possiblity of eradicating evil from one’s own heart, and also from one’s neighbor’s. This doctrine forbids doing that whereby evil has endured for ages and multiplied in the world. He who attacks another and injures him, kindles in the other a feeling of hatred, the root of every evil. To injure another because he has injured us, even with the aim of overcoming evil, is doubling the harm for him and for oneself; it is begetting, or at least setting free and inciting, that evil spirit which we should wish to drive out. Satan can never be driven out by Satan. Error can never be corrected by error, and evil can never be vanquished by evil.

The Non-Resistance movement was not very influential in its own time, but it was transmitted by Tolstoy’s The Kingdom of God is Within You to Gandhi, and thence to Martin Luther King, Jr. and a host of others. Today it can be found in Nicholson Baker’s pacifist history of World War II.

To be clear, I’m NOT claiming that Garrison, Tolstoy, Gandhi, and King would be against affirmative action. That is absurd. Even if you take the implausible, extreme position that an evil can never be corrected by an evil, even a negligible one, it’s still doubtful that affirmative action is an evil. Rather, I’m claiming that opponents of affirmative action adopt a style of argument that has historical connections to pacifism and non-violent resistance. It’s a style of argument that plays on our instinct for purity at any cost: like a plague, what is evil must never be touched. This instinct can be turned to both noble and self-serving ends.

Specialization in the academy

February 3, 2010

Smart words from Louis Menand’s new book:

Interdisciplinarity is not something different from disciplinarity.  It is the ratification of the logic of disciplinarity.  In practice, it actually tends to rigidify disciplinary paradigms.  A typical interdisciplinary situation might bring together, in a classroom, a literature professor and an anthropologist.  The role of the literature professor is to perform qua literature professor, bringing to bear the specialized methods and knowledge of literary study to the subject at hand; the role of the anthropologist is to do the same with the methods of anthropological inquiry.  This methodological constrast is regarded as, in fact, the intellectual and pedagogical takeaway of the collaboration.  What happens is the phenomenon of borrowed authority: the literature professor can incorporate into his work the insights of the anthropologist, in the form of “As anthropology has shown us,” ignoring the probability that the particular insight being recognized is highly contested within the anthropologist’s own discipline.

Because professors are trained to respect the autonomy and expertise of other disciplines, they are rarely in a position to evaluate one another’s claims.  So there is nothing transgressive about interdisciplinarity on this description.  There is nothing even new about it.  Disciplinarity has not only been ratified; it has been fetishized.  The disciplines are treated as the sum of all possible perspectives.

(via)

I would only be more explicit about the dangers of ‘borrowed authority’. It’s not just that it can misrepresent the level of consensus among experts. Even when there really is a consensus among the experts, the fetishization of disciplines can encourage undue deference to their opinion. People start to feel like they can’t question orthodoxy from the outside, indeed that this would be breach of the trust owed to respected collaborators.

Also, my sense is that a similar thing is happening within disciplines: they are fracturing into sub-disciplines and the broadminded, omnivorous thinking that used to be par for the course is now reappearing in a rather contorted form as inter-sub-disciplinary inquiry. And the dangers are similar: narrowness, the presumption of consensus, uncritical deference. In fact, the dangers may be even greater since the distinctions between sub-disciplines are, if anything, even more artificial than the distinctions between disciplines. Anthropologists and literature scholars plausibly occupy separate realms, but how much sense can it make to separate the different branches of anthropology with a fence which then needs to be hopped anyway?

The prophecies of David Brooks

February 2, 2010

I’ll say this about David Brooks: dude has the prophecy thing down. It seems like every week he’s touting a new Answer that will solve all our problems, or at least loosen some persistent knot, but it’s always some completely unrealistic fantasy that just avoids the real issue. Like other would-be prophets, Brooks gets to sit back and feel superior to a world he only muddles.

After Hurricane Katrina and the Haiti Earthquake, he wanted to implant middle-class values among the victims. Never mind food and shelter: if we could only change their hearts and minds, poverty would go away forever.

A few days ago, he was talking about the need for the second coming of Ross Perot. He wanted Obama to adopt the tactics and strategy of a permanent Washington outsider. This time the magic bullet was deficit reduction, never mind that worrying about deficit reduction in the middle of a financial crisis is insane.

If you get a deficit-reduction deal, you break through the polarized rigidities that encrust everything else. You wipe clean the special-interest barnacles that encrust the tax code. You force the country to think in 30-year increments and deliver a blow to the tyranny of the news cycle. You force the country to accept common sacrifice. This is the issue that unlocks everything else. [my emphasis]

Finally, yesterday he proclaimed that healthcare reform could be saved only by a miraculous surge of civic virtue among the elderly:

It now seems clear that the only way the U.S. is going to avoid an economic crisis is if the oldsters take it upon themselves to arise and force change. The young lack the political power. Only the old can lead a generativity revolution — millions of people demanding changes in health care spending and the retirement age to make life better for their grandchildren.

A ‘generativity revolution’ among the elderly would indeed be a great thing–it might even get reform over the top–but you know what would be an even better thing? A ‘generativity revolution’ among everyone else! Brooks says the young, i.e. non-elderly, lack the political power, but even if he’s right about that, surely it’s nothing that a massive spontaneous social movement can’t cure. That’s the problem: in a democracy, anything is feasible in principle with a sufficiently large and impassioned social movement behind it. The hard part is doing it in the real world.

America-hatin’ libruls: a new defense

February 1, 2010

In the two-character dark comedy of American political discourse, Conservatives often accuse Liberals of applying unfairly high standards to their home country: what Liberals condone abroad they condemn at home—plainly, they hate America.

The standard Liberal response is just that they’re not being unfair–Conservatives just can’t handle the truth. A relative minority might argue America that should be held to higher standard, either because it’s exceptionally good or because it’s exceptionally bad.

What is often overlooked is that there is a good argument for applying higher standards to America but NOT because it’s in any way better or worse than other countries.

The basic argument was set out by Levi-Strauss in a different context, that of professional anthropology, as he grappled with the following dilemma: Say you’re an idealistic anthropologist and you want your research into other cultures to help correct injustices in your own. On the one hand, scientific objectivity requires that you approach those alien cultures on their own terms. That is, you need to abstain from any normative judgments about how good or bad those cultures are, lest such judgments distort your research. On the other hand, you want to reserve the right to make judgments about how good or bad your own society is: you are, after all, concerned to correct its injustices. How, then, can you be neutral in the field and committed at home?

Levi-Strauss’s answer, which he claims to derive from Rousseau, is that anthropology is objective but objective knowledge can be legitimately used to advance a moral or political agenda. Science is one thing; how you use it is another. Anthropology uncovers truths about human nature by studying, in an objective way, how societies differ, but this knowledge can then point the way toward genuine improvements in our own society. Here is the key passage from page 391 of Tristes Tropiques (translated by John Russell):

Other societies may not be better than our own; even if we believe them to be so we have no way of proving it. But knowing them better does none the less help us to detach ourselves from our own society. It is not that our society is absolutely evil, or that others are not evil also; but merely that ours is the only society from which we have to disentangle ourselves. In doing so, we put ourselves in position to attempt the second phase of our undertaking: that in which, while not clinging to elements from any one particular society, we make use of one and all of them in order to distinguish those principles of social life which may be applied to the reform of our own customs, and not of those societies foreign to our own. In relation to our own society, that is to say, we stand in a position of privilege which is exactly contrary to that which I have just described; for our own society is the only one which we can transform and yet not destroy, since the changes which we should introduce would come from within. [my emphasis]

In other words, we are to take the same neutral scientific attitude toward all societies, but it is only right that we take a non-neutral moral attitude toward our own society since we are, after all, its members. (It’s worth noting that the lessons that are supposed to be won through anthropological study are not precepts taken from the rulebooks of other cultures, but are instead principles that emerge when you place whole societies side-by-side.)

I think a similar kind of argument can be made in the realm of political science. Political science proper requires a certain level of objectivity and neutrality, but, as political actors in our own polity, we needn’t apply knowledge in a similarly neutral way. We can condemn at home what we condone (better: are neutral about) abroad precisely because we are citizens specially positioned, indeed obligated, to affect what goes on at home. And if all judgments in political science are inevitably colored by the investigator’s implicit normative standards, then, well, we should apply higher standards when we speak as political actors.

Thus, I suspect that many ‘America-hating’ Liberals appear to treat America unfairly because they are sensitive to the different rules governing scientific and political discourse. They are more dispassionate, less inclined to moralize about other countries because it’s not them that they help govern.

Obviously, the same defense is open to Conservatives who are similarly accused of condemning at home what they condone abroad, but it’s most often Liberals who meet with this charge.

Irony in the unreal America

January 31, 2010

From the first line, it calls itself “a response to an ironic time.” Jedediah Purdy’s For Common Things: Irony, Trust, and Commitment in America Today introduces itself as a manifesto against irony, but this impression is misleading—unintentionally so, one can only assume. For one thing, it comes out, albeit in the last chapter, that irony as such isn’t so bad: the right kind of irony is actually a good thing! For another, irony turns out to be only one among several symptoms of a deeper sickness, and not even the most prevalent or pernicious. Nevertheless, you get the sense that the book began in aesthetic distaste—for Jerry Seinfeld and Beavis and Butthead—and only later grew into a reflection on the broader impoverishment of our moral, cultural, and political lives.

To be clear, then, For Common Things is not a work of literary or pop culture criticism, at least not directly. It’s really about the pervasive ethical degradation of our public and private lives. In short, we have become disconnected from the values of honesty, devotion, love, discipline, purpose, dignity, community, and hard work. We mouth endorsement of them, but we no longer live by them. In consequence, we withdraw from our friends, our fellow citizens, and our environment. We embrace distorted or counterfeit values; we live on junk food rather than whole grains. This explains why our politics is so shallow despite its rhetoric, why we abuse the environment and call it sustainable development, why we are tricked into privatizing schools, prisons, hospitals, and utilities, and ultimately, why we are so lonely, frustrated, and unhappy.

That’s all true, and pretty obvious. For Common Things was published a decade ago, but still, if you’re happy with the amount of venality, stupidity, and self-deception in American life, you haven’t been paying attention. Most of us still live lives of quiet desperation.

Purdy is more interesting as a kind of pop sociologist tracing the different lifestyles that feed on this ethical withdrawal. He discuss four, and irony is really only important to one. The first is a literal withdrawal from the world, a hermit-like refusal to have any more than minimal contact with the world, on any terms. This seems to be more or less what his parents did—they abandoned more conventional lives to work a farm in rural West Virginia—until his mother ran for the local school board, a pivotal event in the book. So it’s surprising that it gets only passing mention, uncommon though it is. The other lifestyles that Purdy identifies I will call narcissistic futurism, sentimental hedonism, and naïve ironicism. As social types, these are the hard-charging businessman, the soft-minded housewife, and the affectedly jaded college freshman. As cultural artifacts, they are Wired magazine, Touched by an Angel, and Seinfeld. In different ways, each avoids facing the challenges and possibilities of human life: by self-improvement through faith in ever newer technology, by self-medication through faith in the power of positive thinking, and by self-protection through a lack of faith in anything, including the things one says.

Purdy really needs to be clearer about the distinction between irony and what I have called ironicism. The problem, as I say, is never actually irony but the worship of irony. Irony itself is just another tool, like technology or positive thinking, that can be abused and fetishized, used to do things it cannot ever do and invested with significance it cannot ever have. What is dangerous is not the ironist who simply means something different from what he says but the ironicist who, in his attraction to irony, forgets to mean at all, including what he says. (Clever ironicists sometimes claim to be meaning something, namely the impossibility of really meaning anything, but they more than anyone should recognize how feeble an evasion this is.)

To return to the main topic: Purdy’s best insight is that these three lifestyles, futurism, hedonism, and ironicism, spring from a common source: wounded nihilism, which is to say, disillusionment. Observers as far back as Tocqueville have identified a strand of individual exceptionalism in the American psyche. That is, we all take radical autonomy as our birthright. We all think we are talented enough to achieve dreams of our own design on terms of our own choosing. When we inevitably fail at this, it’s our own fault. This is an insane recipe for psychic self-mutilation, for it imposes impossibly high standards: you not only have to succeed, you have to do it your way. But instead of actually rethinking our hereditary exceptionalism, we build elaborate defense mechanisms. Worse, we deceive ourselves into thinking that life’s hard questions are not worth even an honest attempt, that having no answer is as good as having one, that the traditional answers are indecent, and that the easy and self-serving answers are better than most.

This, I suspect, is why the ironic temperament becomes exhausted so easily. It begins from the idea that each of us should be radically independent, should generate ourselves from our own will and imagination. When that ambition disappoints, and his phrases and acts do not glisten with newness, the ironist treats his own derivative behavior with the vague contempt that a selfishly expectant parent might show toward a child who fails to perform.

At least in the abstract, the antidote to this disillusionment is clear: less individualism, less exceptionalism, finding meaning in one’s one place in the larger community and in the larger tradition. “The exercise of a good mind, or a good personality, is the accomplishment not of escaping a tradition but of having understood its elements well enough to make them one’s own reflectively, to sort and distinguish among them.” Far less clear are the concrete steps to this goal. There are powerful suggestions though. Purdy radiates an attachment to the farm life that he was raised on. He speaks approvingly of Wendell Berry, who rediscovered the joys of a simpler, earthbound life when we returned from New York to rural Kentucky. But he falls short of actually making a general endorse of the agrarian ideal. Berry is treated mostly as an example of how, with freely chosen commitment, we trade some our freedom for greater fulfillment. When Purdy discusses his own idyll, it’s always with the disclaimer that, well, he can’t help it, it’s what he knows, it’s the means by which more general lessons were first taught.

This is a bit annoying, though. It shades into the idea that the rural life is somehow in itself magical, incorruptible. It’s no doubt better than many, and better than most people think. But it’s no guarantee; everything, even idyll, has its degraded double. Fortunately, I’m quite sure Purdy isn’t so simple-minded. But in that case he owes us I think some suggestion of what the fabric of non-rural but similarly grounded life would look like. It’s hard, but important: without it Purdy’s ethical ideals are bound to seem remote. If Purdy’s upbringing entitles him to his rural touchstone, city- and suburb-dwellers are entitled to help in finding theirs.

Purdy’s championing of tradition and community can also come off as significantly more parochial than (I think) it is. To be sure, we are shaped by our communities. The withdrawal of a few can make a community collapse like an ecosystem: as more people withdraw, the incentive to stay committed goes down, and so the pace of withdrawal accelerates. And to be sure, common things are among the most precious, useful, and visible things threatened by ethical withdrawal. But other, private things are also degraded. Purdy sometimes suggests that this is because common things are being degraded, but it’s not as though community and tradition are the special founts of value in the world. However, he sometimes gives the impression that community is the key to it all: “so far as we care for anything at all, we must hope for a great deal from a great number of people, institutions, and relationships in which whatever we immediately care for is caught up.” But in general, things don’t have power because they are part of a tradition. More precisely, they might, but only a secondary kind of power that it would be criminal to mistake for their core. It’s the opposite: more often than not, things are part of a tradition because they have power in themselves. Traditions get things wrong, and can be added to or revised in novel and unexpected ways. This is because the power they draw on is independent of them. The same thing goes for community. It’s good to be connected to a community, but most valuable things connect to us to a community only because they have real, independent value, not vice versa, which at its worst is an insidious kind of collectivism.

Perhaps inspired by a farm life in which man and nature seem to fit together, Purdy has decisive tendencies toward a kind of holism. The parts of his universe are not just impressively organized but fused. Straightforward prose is connected to personal earnestness is connected to manual work is connected to social democracy is connected to an affinity for nature is connected to an ability to feast on mundane beauty. A threat to a part is a threat to the whole. Purdy’s somewhat surprising focus on irony is partly explained by his epigraph, Czeslaw Milosz’s claim that ‘what is unpronounced tends to nonexistence’. In other words, irony threatens earnestness and so the things it is worth being earnest about. But is this true? Does Seinfeld threaten mountains in West Virginia? Does reading Wired magazine lend covert support to school privatization? There is something unsettling in the thought that the human world, because continuous with the natural, should have a moral order as precise and fragile and total as nature’s ecological order. It may not amount to much, but Purdy is awfully fond of the phrase “moral ecology”.

Surely the human world is more complex and fractured than all that, with complicated and sometimes contradictory lines of dependence. Everything is connected, but only more or less, and often in ways that we are free to shape. But even as we inhabit different spheres, we are still individuals: we do only one thing at a time. Because of this limitation, irony can help us navigate and explore our complex and sometimes conflicting commitments. Ironically, Purdy is often a good spokesman for irony. He thinks it was crucial to Montaigne’s ability to negotiate of French life in the wake of religious war, and used correctly, irony can work “surprise, delight, and reverence” from banal materials.

It’s certainly bad to get wrapped up in symbols instead of the important things they’re supposed to stand for. There is far too much of this nowadays, but it has nothing much to do with irony. If anything, irony can help prevent it. Nevertheless, the ironist is an easy target because he is hard to read. Instead of considering what he is actually saying, you can criticize him as duplicitous for not speaking straightforwardly and as cowardly for his (apparent) failure to commit himself. Irony sometimes masks these defects and worse, but modern irony is often a response to the complexity of our times, and it is easier to rail against the ironist than examine the conditions which make irony necessary.

Wikipedia links

January 30, 2010
tags:

1. Horned gopher

2. Double-tusked narwhals

3. Mary Edwards Walker, male impersonator and winner of the Medal of Honor

4. Upright jerker

5. My postillion has been struck by lightning

The genius of ‘Reality TV’

January 29, 2010

Whoever invented the phrase ‘reality TV’ was a stone-cold genius. It’s an oxymoron, but like other bits of literal nonsense–zen koans, the Christian trinity–it gives off a powerful illusion of depth. It says: “These shows transcend TV. Indeed, they transcend entertainment. They reveal something fundamental about the nature of reality in a postmodern age. They are an important, if embarrassing moment in Western civilization.” Perfectly pitched to a society of anxious but TV-addicted pop philosophers, ‘reality TV’ is an irresistible invitation to pontificate about reality and it’s degradation. It brilliantly turns high-minded criticisms of the genre to its advantage, for there are few things as interesting as dispatches from the front lines of the apocalypse.

Of course, this idea that reality TV reveals anything deep about reality is itself an illusion. For one thing, as this article points out, most of people’s worst fears never came to pass. There’s been nothing like The Truman Show. There have been a few short-lived shows were the participants are deceived about the premises, but never where they’re deceived about being on a reality TV show. In any case, the most successful reality shows aren’t like this. Moreover, it turns out that audiences are more interested in drama than spectacle. It was feared that since anyone can be on reality TV, people would be pushed to do ever more humiliating things. That’s been proven true, but only up to a point. The shows that thrive most on pure spectacle, things like Fear Factor and Who Wants to Marry a Millionaire?, have mostly fallen by the wayside. The truth is that, as with many things, being a reality TV star is harder than it looks. Reality shows are meticulously cast. The most successful shows are those that mint their own stars, people with outsize personalities who create emotional tension, the more soap opera-like the better. Audiences are more sentimental than bloodthirsty.

Indeed, most reality TV is a kind of modified soap opera. It thrives on the same empathies, on the same outsize gestures, and on many of the same storylines. But the premise of reality gives cover to viewers who are far too sophisticated to invest themselves in actual soap operas. We want to see bad behavior, but only if it’s real. Of course, this can only last so long. Eventually we remind ourselves that a) we really shouldn’t enjoy bad behavior so much and b) it’s not that real anyway. It’s at this point that I think the illusion about the great Importance of Reality TV kicks in. We tell ourselves that we are watching only to keep tabs on the metaphysical fraying of reality. It also introduces a new villain to the soap opera, the best, most shadowy one of all: the one behind the camera.

Art and stupidity

January 28, 2010

“Prelude to the Twentieth Century,” Roberto Calasso’s essay on Flaubert’s Bouvard et Pécuchet begins hilariously:

When I think of The Book of our century, I don’t turn to À la recherche or Ulysses or The Man Without Qualities, those majestic constructions, exemplary not only for their genius but for their precision and obsessiveness as well, to which public opinion now grants due respect, as to those cathedrals made of toothpicks that some provincial hermit has spent the best years of his life silently building.

It’s funny ’cause it’s true…

But then it gets scary:

…everything in the world is born accompanied by its degraded Double; not only every knickknack but every idea.

Just as there is romantic kitsch and classical kitsch, as well the Renaissance, Gothic, and ‘modern’ varieties, so now Stupidity reformulates Platonism and paleontology, emotions and rationality, rebellion and subjugation, disbelief and devotion. The two bonshommes Bouvard and Pécuchet (and Flaubert inside them) then discover that Stupidity is no longer a characteristic of certain ideas. On the contrary, with the even-handed impassiveness of a god, it distributes itself in all directions: among believers and atheists, countryfolk and city dwellers, poets and mathematicians. Stupidity is the bloodthirsty paper realm of public opinion.

Obviously, he’s not talking about stupidity in any quantifiable sense, the kind of thing that a credential might ward off. It’s not lack of knowledge but lack of something else, wisdom maybe, though there is certainly kitsch wisdom. For Calasso, if Ulysses and The Man Without Qualities have become kitschified then Bouvard and Pécuchet embody the animal instinct that seeks hopelessly after kitsch.